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Abstract
This study provides a contemporary understanding of demand relations in European
Union (EU) international message telephone service (IMTS) markets prior to full
liberalization at January 1 1998. Point-to-point demand equations that relate IMTS demand
to prices, income, population and distance are estimated on bilateral market data for ten EU
countries from 1990 to 1995. Model estimates suggest price elasticities of outgoing and
incoming demand between 20.175 and 20.456, and 20.215 and 20.674, respectively.
These elasticity estimates provide an empirical base from which to calculate welfare gains
from the full deregulation of EU IMTS markets after 1998. Ó 2001 Elsevier Science B.V.
All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
At the end of the 1980s, the European Commission embarked on an ambitious
liberalisation program of European domestic and international telecommunications
1 markets. The main goal was to promote market structures that would enable the
exploitation of substantial demand and innovation potentials in the industry. A
* Corresponding author. Tel.: 161-8-9266-7051; fax: 161-8-9266-2391.
E-mail address: maddeng@cbs.curtin.edu.au (G. Madden).
1 Carriers provide international message telephone service (IMTS) by connecting their domestic
networks to international half-circuits. Cost sharing arrangements between countries arranged through
the accounting rate system.
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major milestone of this program was 1 January 1998, the date whereby all
telecommunications infrastructure and services were open to full competition
2 (Kiessling and Blondeel, 1998). A further transformation in the sector has been
the separation of the regulator from the telecommunications operator for all 15 EU
countries (International Telecommunication Union (ITU), 1998a). The 1999
Communications Review stresses the positive results of the current telecommuni-
cations regulatory framework that has transformed a sector traditionally character-
ized by state monopolies into a dynamic industry ready to take full advantage of
the global market (de Cockborne, 1999).
This study provides an understanding of IMTS demand relations in EU markets
prior to full liberalization by estimating the price elasticity of demand for a sample
of 11 countries from 1990 to 1995. The analysis provides an empirical base from
which to calculate welfare gains from EU IMTS market deregulation. The paper is
organized as follows. Section 2 provides a selective review of representative IMTS
demand analyses. A point-to-point IMTS demand model, and data used for
estimation, are described in Section 3. Section 4 reports estimation results and
ﬂow-through demand elasticities, whilst Section 5 provides concluding comments.
2. Received demand analysis
Lago (1970) employs pooled cross-section,time-series data for 26 US markets
from 1962 to 1964 to explain US outgoing IMTS trafﬁc. Using ordinary least
squares (OLS) to regress trafﬁc on price, trade, foreign investment, tourist
expenditure, foreign telephones, and US population with foreign parents, Lago
reports a price elasticity of demand of 21.249. Yatrakis (1972) extends Lago’s
model to include demographic variables such as language commonality, and both
tourist and immigrant arrivals. OLS estimation on a cross-section of 46 US
markets for 1967 reveals a price elasticity of demand which ranges from 21.030
to 21.135. Rea and Lage (1978) examine US outgoing trafﬁc for 37 bilateral
markets from 1964 to 1973, and allow cross-price effects to be measured by the
price of telex and telegraph service. Fixed- and random-effects model estimates
suggest a price elasticity of demand between 20.548 and 20.725 for the full
sample period, whilst corresponding elasticities for 1969 to 1973 are between
21.718 and 21.915.
Larson et al. (1988) propose a point-to-point demand model which allow calls
in one direction to affect return calls through reversion and reciprocity. The model
is particularly useful for examining the impact of asymmetric pricing and call
inter-dependence on IMTS market demand. Appelbe et al. (1988) employ a
point-to-point model to estimate Canada–US market demand at 1986. Three-stage-
least squares estimation of outgoing and incoming demand equations provide
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ﬂow-through price and reciprocal calling elasticity’s of demand which range from
20.43 to 20.53 and 0.24 to 0.47, respectively. Acton and Vogelsang (1992) use
a point-to-point model to examine call reversion and reciprocity between the US
and 17 Western European countries from 1979 through 1986. Reduced-form
equations allow the estimation of cross-country price elasticities of demand, that
is, the responsiveness of US (European) demand with respect to European (US)
collection rate changes. Two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimates indicate own-
price elasticities of 20.49 and 20.36, but insigniﬁcant cross-country price
3 elasticities. Finally, Hackl and Westlund (1995) estimate time-varying price
elasticities for Swedish outgoing trafﬁc on monthly data for 1976 through 1990.
Using a moving-local regressions approach, which ﬁts regression models to a
window of data that shifts over the observation period, they provide short- and
long-run price elasticities of IMTS demand. Model results suggest a longer sample
period is associated with a larger price elasticity of demand.
The above sample of studies illustrate that many changes have occurred in
statistical techniques employed to examine IMTS trafﬁc. Further, early studies
consider aggregate unidirectional and static relationships. Whilst these studies
suggest IMTS demand is own-price elastic, point-to-point demand analyses
suggest otherwise. In summary, the received evidence indicates that changes in
data and statistical techniques used have coincided with a downward revision of
reported elasticity estimates.
3. Empirical model and data
Consistent estimation of point-to-point demand requires simultaneous estimation
of incoming and outgoing equations, with explicit accounting for the inﬂuence of
return trafﬁc on originating IMTS (Larson et al., 1988). Estimating equations for
EU IMTS are:
A ln Q 5b 1b ln P 1b ln Q 1b ln M 1b ln POP AB 0 1 A 2 BA 3 4
A 1b ln DIST 1m (1) 5
B ln Q 5d 1d ln P 1d ln Q 1d ln M 1d ln POP 1d ln DIST BA 0 1 B 2 AB 3 4 5
B 1m (2)
where ln denotes the natural logarithm, Q (Q ) is minutes of outgoing AB BA
3 The latter result suggests either the absence of call reversion or reciprocity, or the induced trafﬁc
from directions is cancelled out. Acton and Vogelsang (1992) suggest that call reversion occurs only
when the difference between outgoing and incoming collection rates is sufﬁcient to cover switching
costs. Once this threshold is reached, consumers in high-price countries will re-originate calls from
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telephone trafﬁc from A to B (B to A), P is the real collection rate (retail price) for
a call from A (B) to B (A), M is real GDP per capita of A (B), POP is the product
of the populations of A and B, DIST is the absolute distance (kilometers) between
4 the capital cities of A and B, while the m are a random error terms.
Eqs. (1) and (2) are estimated by 2SLS on annual data for the EU Member
States Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal,
5 Spain and the UK for the period 1990 to 1995. Trafﬁc, mainlines, business and
residential telephone monthly subscriptions data are from the ITU (1996, 1998b)
and TeleGeography (1992–97), whilst collection rates are obtained from the
OECD’s (1990–97) Communications Outlook. Population, real and nominal gross
domestic product (GDP) and the consumer price index are from the World Bank
(1998). Distance (in kilometers) between capital cities is obtained from Bali
Online (2000). Indicators of economic and telecommunications development for
the sample countries are provided in Table 1. As expected, main telephone lines
per 100 inhabitants (teldensity), income (GDP per capita) and outgoing IMTS
minutes are relatively high for all sample countries. Only the United Kingdom
(UK) allowed IMTS competition during the sample period 1990–1995, whilst
several countries commenced privatization of their dominant carriers. At 1996,
three countries had dominant IMTS carriers with majority private control. Note the
Table 1
a EU Telecommunications indicators
Country Teldensity Income (USD) IMTS trafﬁc Competition Private
1995 1995 1996 ownership
Belgium 46 26 570 1166 1998 49.9
Denmark 61 33 135 570 1998 49.0
France 56 26 462 2970 1998 20.0
Germany 49 29 564 5200 1998 20.0
Greece 49 10 934 518 – 8.0
Italy 43 18 979 2124 1998 38.0
Netherlands 52 25 586 1534 1997 55.0
Portugal 36 9 249 340 – 49.3
Spain 38 14 260 1189 1998 79.0
UK 50 18 861 4539 1984 99.0
a Teledensity is main telephone lines per 100 inhabitants. Income is real GDP per capita. IMTS
trafﬁc is million minutes of outgoing IMTS trafﬁc. Competition is the year competition was introduced
into IMTS markets. Private ownership is the share of private ownership for the dominant IMTS carrier.
Source: ITU (1998a,b).
4 Both Q and Q are endogenous, whilst P is deemed exogenous because nine of ten markets had AB BA
a monopoly service provider during the sample period (as such, price was generally regulated and
independent of demand).
5 Ireland and Luxembourg are omitted, as complete point-to-point trafﬁc information are not
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effect of the EU’s telecommunications liberalization program is more pronounced
after 1997. At 1998, seven of the 11 sample countries introduced competition in
the supply of IMTS calls.
A description of sample country trafﬁc and collection rates is provided in Table
2, Figs. 1 and 2, respectively. Table 2 shows that the France–Germany route has
the largest annual average trafﬁc ﬂow in the EU, with an average of 619.7 million
minutes per annum (p.a.). The second largest route is Germany–UK with an
average of 617.43 million minutes p.a., followed by France–UK with 559.8
million minutes p.a. The least trafﬁc is for Portugal–Greece with 1.29 million
minutes p.a. Casual interpretation of Fig. 1 suggests an apparent downward trend
in mean collection rates for EU Member States. The average collection rate
between member countries declined 27 percent between 1990 and 1995 from 0.81
to 0.59 cents per minute. However, the relativity between countries remained
unchanged, with France having the lowest average annual peak per minute
collection rate in 1995 and Greece the highest. Fig. 2 shows the deviation of the
collection rates for EU Member States contained in the sample. The dispersion of
collection rates has fallen substantially since 1992.
Table 2
a Annual average bilateral trafﬁc 1990–1995
Route IMTS trafﬁc Route IMTS trafﬁc
(million minutes) (million minutes)
Belgium–Denmark 17.40 France–UK 559.83
Belgium–France 420.55 Germany–Greece 164.74
Belgium–Germany 245.20 Germany–Italy 545.92
Belgium–Greece 17.97 Germany–Netherlands 547.45
Belgium–Italy 93.75 Germany–Portugal 69.59
Belgium–Netherlands 389.32 Germany–Spain 254.58
Belgium–Portugal 17.00 Germany–UK 617.43
Belgium–Spain 56.23 Greece–Italy 55.18
Belgium–UK 166.15 Greece–Netherlands 17.83
Denmark–France 39.03 Greece–Portugal 1.29
Denmark–Germany 166.73 Greece–Spain 6.43
Denmark–Greece 5.28 Greece–UK 88.58
Denmark–Italy 21.30 Italy–Netherlands 71.47
Denmark–Netherlands 35.04 Italy–Portugal 17.37
Denmark–Portugal 4.26 Italy–Spain 111.70
Denmark–Spain 17.73 Italy–UK 256.18
Denmark–UK 94.13 Netherlands–Portugal 15.86
France–Germany 619.70 Netherlands–Spain 64.48
France–Greece 35.61 Netherlands–UK 283.33
France–Italy 421.79 Portugal–Spain 65.39
France–Netherlands 172.54 Portugal–UK 58.77
France–Portugal 161.83 Spain–UK 246.32
France–Spain 295.56 Average 169.64
a Source: ITU (1996), OECD (1990–97), TeleGeography (1992–97).132 G. Madden et al. / Information Economics and Policy 13 (2001) 127–136
Fig. 1. Average annual per minute collection rate 1990–1995. Source: ITU (1996), OECD (1990–97),
TeleGeography (1992–97).
4. Estimation results
Pre-testing indicates the presence of heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation in
the 2SLS estimates of Eqs. (1) and (2). Accordingly, a pooled cross-section,time-G. Madden et al. / Information Economics and Policy 13 (2001) 127–136 133
Fig. 2. Standard deviation of collection rates 1990–1995. Source: ITU (1996), OECD (1990–97),
TeleGeography (1992–97).
series approach is employed to estimate the demand system which controls for
heterogeneity and autocorrelation. Most estimated equations appear well speciﬁed
with all the estimated parameters conforming to a priori expectations except the
price variable for outgoing demand for Spain. Reverse trafﬁc, income and134 G. Madden et al. / Information Economics and Policy 13 (2001) 127–136
population are found to have a positive effect on outgoing demand, whilst price
6 and distance have a negative effect on outgoing demand.
A positive coefﬁcient for incoming trafﬁc suggests that price changes effect
trafﬁc ﬂows in both directions. In order to obtain the total effect on demand of a
change in any of the explanatory variables it is necessary to eliminate all
right-hand side endogenous variables by substituting incoming trafﬁc for the
7 reduced-form equations. Estimated ﬂow-through demand elasticities are reported
in Table 3 along with the reverse trafﬁc coefﬁcients. IMTS price elasticities of
demand are inelastic and qualitatively similar to recent estimates by Ford and
8 Jackson (1999). From Table 3 there appears no systematic relationship between
the magnitude of ﬂow-through price elasticities of demand and national income
levels. High- and low-income Member States have an average elasticity of 20.2,
whilst the middle-income band report an average elasticity of 20.3. For the
incoming IMTS demand equation, whilst inelastic, the relative magnitudes of the
Table 3
a Flow-through elasticity
Country Outgoing trafﬁc Incoming trafﬁc
Price Reverse Income Price Reverse Income
trafﬁc trafﬁc
High income
France 20.157 0.174 2.283 20.574 0.237 0.178
Germany 20.255 0.252 0.566 n.s. 0.462 0.706
UK n.s. 1.037 n.s. 20.547 n.s. 0.574
Medium income
Belgium 20.456 0.363 0.989 20.258 0.290 0.226
Italy n.s. 0.691 2.698 20.215 0.411 0.447
Netherlands 20.267 n.s. 3.169 20.287 0.378 n.s.
Spain n.s. 0.947 0.260 20.674 0.755 0.446
Low income
Denmark 20.175 n.s. 2.326 20.334 0.597 n.s.
Greece n.s. 0.814 4.385 20.501 0.150 2.070
Portugal n.s. n.s. 9.083 20.393 0.553 0.573
a n.s. indicates the estimated coefﬁcient is not signiﬁcant at 5% level.
6 Severe multicollinearity exists for the German and Portuguese demand equations so dummy
variables are used to replace DIST to isolate trafﬁc band effects. Dummy variables for high-income
(France, Germany and the UK) and middle-income (Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands and Spain)
Member States are also included. Estimation results are available from the authors on request.
7 For instance, ﬂow-through price and income elasticity of demand measures for A are:
­ ln Q b ­ ln Q b AB 1 AB 3 ]] ]] ]] ]] 5 and 5 (3) A ­ ln P 12bd 12bd ­ ln M A2 2 2 2
8 Ford and Jackson (1999) estimate US point-to-point demand equations from 1985 to 1994 and
report short-run price elasticities for US–Europe trafﬁc which range from 20.13 to 20.26.G. Madden et al. / Information Economics and Policy 13 (2001) 127–136 135
coefﬁcients are reversed. The price elasticity of demand is most elastic in the
middle-income band, followed by high- and low-income bands. However, there is
a clear pattern between the outgoing IMTS demand ﬂow-through income elasticity
and national income levels. The lower is national income the more elastic is
demand. However, this pattern does not hold for incoming trafﬁc. Demand is
mostly income inelastic, but more elastic for the low-income country band.
5. Conclusions
Prior to 1998 IMTS trafﬁc was subject to regulation in EU countries with
governments regularly reviewing capacity and IMTS pricing. Given the EU’s
move to full liberalization after 1998, telecommunications policy would beneﬁt
from a better understanding of the structure of demand so as to enable the
improved projection of trafﬁc patterns and deﬁcits. IMTS demand elasticity
estimates could also provide useful inputs into an examination of alternative
pricing policies on use, capacity and economic welfare. Here, outgoing and
incoming IMTS demand equations are estimated for ten EU Member States.
Estimates of ﬂow-through price elasticities suggest IMTS demand is price
inelastic. Accordingly, a reduction in call prices by Member States would not
necessarily increase producer surplus in the short-run and only increase consumer
surplus marginally. A caveat on the results is that collection rates used for
estimation are peak per minute rates, and quite often business is able to negotiate
lower rates. Should sample data be dominated by business trafﬁc then the reported
elasticity magnitudes may be overstated.
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